Blogroll Category: Technology

I read blogs, as well as write one. The 'blogroll' on this site reproduces some posts from some of the people I enjoy reading. There are currently 76 posts from the category 'Technology.'

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Cloudflare Global Network Expands to 193 Cities

CloudFlare - Thu, 15/08/2019 - 02:41
Cloudflare Global Network Expands to 193 Cities

Cloudflare’s global network currently spans 193 cities across 90+ countries. With over 20 million Internet properties on our network, we increase the security, performance, and reliability of large portions of the Internet every time we add a location.

Cloudflare Global Network Expands to 193 CitiesExpanding Network to New Cities

So far in 2019, we’ve added a score of new locations: Amman, Antananarivo*, Arica*, Asunción, Baku, Bengaluru, Buffalo, Casablanca, Córdoba*, Cork, Curitiba, Dakar*, Dar es Salaam, Fortaleza, Geneva, Göteborg, Guatemala City, Hyderabad, Kigali, Kolkata, Male*, Maputo, Nagpur, Neuquén*, Nicosia, Nouméa, Ottawa, Port-au-Prince, Porto Alegre, Querétaro, Ramallah, and Thessaloniki.

Our Humble Beginnings

When Cloudflare launched in 2010, we focused on putting servers at the Internet’s crossroads: large data centers with key connections, like the Amsterdam Internet Exchange and Equinix Ashburn. This not only provided the most value to the most people at once but was also easier to manage by keeping our servers in the same buildings as all the local ISPs, server providers, and other people they needed to talk to streamline our services.

This is a great approach for bootstrapping a global network, but we’re obsessed with speed in general. There are over five hundred cities in the world with over one million inhabitants, but only a handful of them have the kinds of major Internet exchanges that we targeted. Our goal as a company is to help make a better Internet for all, not just those lucky enough to live in areas with affordable and easily-accessible interconnection points. However, we ran up against two broad, nasty problems: a) running out of major Internet exchanges and b) latency still wasn’t as low as we wanted. Clearly, we had to start scaling in new ways.

One of our first big steps was entering into partnerships around the world with local ISPs, who have many of the same problems we do: ISPs want to save money and provide fast Internet to their customers, but they often don’t have a major Internet exchange nearby to connect to. Adding Cloudflare equipment to their infrastructure effectively brought more of the Internet closer to them. We help them speed up millions of Internet properties while reducing costs by serving traffic locally. Additionally, since all of our servers are designed to support all our products, a relatively small physical footprint can also provide security, performance, reliability, and more.

Upgrading Capacity in Existing Cities

Though it may be obvious and easy to overlook, continuing to build out existing locations is also a key facet of building a global network. This year, we have significantly increased the computational capacity at the edge of our network. Additionally, by making it easier to interconnect with Cloudflare, we have increased the number of unique networks directly connected with us to over 8,000. This makes for a faster, more reliable Internet experience for the >1 billion IPs that we see daily.

To make these capacity upgrades possible for our customers, efficient infrastructure deployment has been one of our keys to success. We want our infrastructure deployment to be targeted and flexible.

Targeted Deployment

The next Cloudflare customer through our door could be a small restaurant owner on a Pro plan with thousands of monthly pageviews or a fast-growing global tech company like Discord. As a result, we need to always stay one step ahead and synthesize a lot of data all at once for our customers.

To accommodate this expansion, our Capacity Planning team is learning new ways to optimize our servers. One key strategy is targeting exactly where to send our servers. However, staying on top of everything isn’t easy - we are a global anycast network, which introduces unpredictability as to where incoming traffic goes. To make things even more difficult, each city can contain as many as five distinct deployments. Planning isn’t just a question of what city to send servers to, it’s one of which address.

To make sense of it all, we tackle the problem with simulations. Some, but not all, of the variables we model include historical traffic growth rates, foreseeable anomalous spikes (e.g., Cyber Day in Chile), and consumption states from our live deal pipeline, as well as product costs, user growth, end-customer adoption. We also add in site reliability, potential for expansion, and expected regional expansion and partnerships, as well as strategic priorities and, of course, feedback from our fantastic Systems Reliability Engineers.

Flexible Supply Chain

Knowing where to send a server is only the first challenge of many when it comes to a global network. Just like our user base, our supply chain must span the entire world while also staying flexible enough to quickly react to time constraints, pricing changes including taxes and tariffs, import/export restrictions and required certifications - not to mention local partnerships many more dynamic location-specific variables. Even more reason we have to stay quick on our feet, there will always be unforeseen roadblocks and detours even in the most well-prepared plans. For example, a planned expansion in our Prague location might warrant an expanded presence in Vienna for failover.

Once servers arrive at our data centers, our Data Center Deployment and Technical Operations teams work with our vendors and on-site data center personnel (our “Remote Hands” and “Smart Hands”) to install the physical server, manage the cabling, and handle other early-stage provisioning processes.

Our architecture, which is designed so that every server can support every service, makes it easier to withstand hardware failures and efficiently load balance workloads between equipment and between locations.

Join Our Team

If working at a rapidly expanding, globally diverse company interests you, we’re hiring for scores of positions, including in the Infrastructure group. If you want to help increase hardware efficiency, deploy and maintain servers, work on our supply chain, or strengthen ISP partnerships, get in touch.

*Represents cities where we have data centers with active Internet ports and where we are configuring our servers to handle traffic for more customers (at the time of publishing)

Categories: Technology

Forms Steps - Critical - Access bypass - SA-CONTRIB-2019-064

Drupal Contrib Security - Wed, 14/08/2019 - 18:33
Project: Forms StepsDate: 2019-August-14Security risk: Critical 16∕25 AC:Basic/A:None/CI:Some/II:Some/E:Theoretical/TD:AllVulnerability: Access bypassDescription: 

Forms Steps provides an UI to create form workflows using form modes. It creates quick and configurable multisteps forms.

The module doesn't sufficiently check user permissions to access its workflows entities that allows to see any entities that have been created through the different steps of its multistep forms.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that you have to know the Forms Steps URL to create a content linked to the flow. Also, all created content is very hard to edit through the same flow as you have to know the URL and the linked hash to the content.

Solution: 

Install the latest version:

Also see the Forms Steps project page.

Reported By: Fixed By: Coordinated By: 
Categories: Technology

External Links Filter - Moderately critical - Open Redirect Vulnerability - SA-CONTRIB-2019-063

Drupal Contrib Security - Wed, 14/08/2019 - 18:26
Project: External Links FilterDate: 2019-August-14Security risk: Moderately critical 10∕25 AC:Basic/A:None/CI:None/II:None/E:Theoretical/TD:AllVulnerability: Open Redirect VulnerabilityDescription: 

The External Link Filter module provides an input filter that replaces external links by a local link that redirects to the target URL.

The module did not have protection for the Redirect URL to go where content authors intended.

Solution: 

Install the latest version:

Also see the External Links Filter project page.

Reported By: Fixed By: Coordinated By: 
Categories: Technology

Super Login - Moderately critical - Cross site scripting - SA-CONTRIB-2019-062

Drupal Contrib Security - Wed, 14/08/2019 - 18:14
Project: Super LoginDate: 2019-August-14Security risk: Moderately critical 13∕25 AC:Basic/A:Admin/CI:Some/II:Some/E:Theoretical/TD:AllVulnerability: Cross site scriptingDescription: 

This module improves the Drupal login page with the new features and layout.

The module doesn't sufficiently filter input text in the administration pages text configuration inputs. For example, the login text field.

The vulnerability is mitigated by the fact it can only be exploited by a user with the "Administer super login" permission.

Solution: 

Install the latest version:

Also see the Super Login project page.

Reported By: Fixed By: Coordinated By: 
Categories: Technology

scroll to top - Moderately critical - Cross site scripting - SA-CONTRIB-2019-061

Drupal Contrib Security - Wed, 14/08/2019 - 18:01
Project: scroll to topDate: 2019-August-14Security risk: Moderately critical 13∕25 AC:Basic/A:Admin/CI:Some/II:Some/E:Theoretical/TD:AllVulnerability: Cross site scriptingDescription: 

The Scroll To Top module enables you to have an animated scroll to top link in the bottom of the node.

The module does not sufficiently filter configuration text leading to a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.

This vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that an attacker must have a role with the permission "administer scroll to top".

Solution: 

Install the latest version of the module.

Also see the scroll to top project page.

Reported By: Fixed By: Coordinated By: 
Categories: Technology

Building a GraphQL server on the edge with Cloudflare Workers

CloudFlare - Wed, 14/08/2019 - 04:21
Building a GraphQL server on the edge with Cloudflare WorkersBuilding a GraphQL server on the edge with Cloudflare Workers

Today, we're open-sourcing an exciting project that showcases the strengths of our Cloudflare Workers platform: workers-graphql-server is a batteries-included Apollo GraphQL server, designed to get you up and running quickly with GraphQL.

Building a GraphQL server on the edge with Cloudflare WorkersTesting GraphQL queries in the GraphQL Playground

As a full-stack developer, I’m really excited about GraphQL. I love building user interfaces with React, but as a project gets more complex, it can become really difficult to manage how your data is managed inside of an application. GraphQL makes that really easy - instead of having to recall the REST URL structure of your backend API, or remember when your backend server doesn't quite follow REST conventions - you just tell GraphQL what data you want, and it takes care of the rest.

Cloudflare Workers is uniquely suited as a platform to being an incredible place to host a GraphQL server. Because your code is running on Cloudflare's servers around the world, the average latency for your requests is extremely low, and by using Wrangler, our open-source command line tool for building and managing Workers projects, you can deploy new versions of your GraphQL server around the world within seconds.

If you'd like to try the GraphQL server, check out a demo GraphQL playground, deployed on Workers.dev. This optional add-on to the GraphQL server allows you to experiment with GraphQL queries and mutations, giving you a super powerful way to understand how to interface with your data, without having to hop into a codebase.

If you're ready to get started building your own GraphQL server with our new open-source project, we've added a new tutorial to our Workers documentation to help you get up and running - check it out here!

Finally, if you're interested in how the project works, or want to help contribute - it's open-source! We'd love to hear your feedback and see your contributions. Check out the project on GitHub.

Categories: Technology

On the recent HTTP/2 DoS attacks

CloudFlare - Tue, 13/08/2019 - 18:00
On the recent HTTP/2 DoS attacksOn the recent HTTP/2 DoS attacks

Today, multiple Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities were disclosed for a number of HTTP/2 server implementations. Cloudflare uses NGINX for HTTP/2. Customers using Cloudflare are already protected against these attacks.

The individual vulnerabilities, originally discovered by Netflix and are included in this announcement are:

As soon as we became aware of these vulnerabilities, Cloudflare’s Protocols team started working on fixing them. We first pushed a patch to detect any attack attempts and to see if any normal traffic would be affected by our mitigations. This was followed up with work to mitigate these vulnerabilities; we pushed the changes out few weeks ago and continue to monitor similar attacks on our stack.

If any of our customers host web services over HTTP/2 on an alternative, publicly accessible path that is not behind Cloudflare, we recommend you apply the latest security updates to your origin servers in order to protect yourselves from these HTTP/2 vulnerabilities.

We will soon follow up with more details on these vulnerabilities and how we mitigated them.

Full credit for the discovery of these vulnerabilities goes to Jonathan Looney of Netflix and Piotr Sikora of Google and the Envoy Security Team.

Categories: Technology

Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operate

CloudFlare - Tue, 13/08/2019 - 14:01
Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operate

Today we’re excited to announce Cloudflare Magic Transit. Magic Transit provides secure, performant, and reliable IP connectivity to the Internet. Out-of-the-box, Magic Transit deployed in front of your on-premise network protects it from DDoS attack and enables provisioning of a full suite of virtual network functions, including advanced packet filtering, load balancing, and traffic management tools.

Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operate

Magic Transit is built on the standards and networking primitives you are familiar with, but delivered from Cloudflare’s global edge network as a service. Traffic is ingested by the Cloudflare Network with anycast and BGP, announcing your company’s IP address space and extending your network presence globally. Today, our anycast edge network spans 193 cities in more than 90 countries around the world.

Once packets hit our network, traffic is inspected for attacks, filtered, steered, accelerated, and sent onward to the origin. Magic Transit will connect back to your origin infrastructure over Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels, private network interconnects (PNI), or other forms of peering.

Enterprises are often forced to pick between performance and security when deploying IP network services. Magic Transit is designed from the ground up to minimize these trade-offs: performance and security are better together. Magic Transit deploys IP security services across our entire global network. This means no more diverting traffic to small numbers of distant “scrubbing centers” or relying on on-premise hardware to mitigate attacks on your infrastructure.

We’ve been laying the groundwork for Magic Transit for as long as Cloudflare has been in existence, since 2010. Scaling and securing the IP network Cloudflare is built on has required tooling that would have been impossible or exorbitantly expensive to buy. So we built the tools ourselves! We grew up in the age of software-defined networking and network function virtualization, and the principles behind these modern concepts run through everything we do.

When we talk to our customers managing on-premise networks, we consistently hear a few things: building and managing their networks is expensive and painful, and those on-premise networks aren’t going away anytime soon.

Traditionally, CIOs trying to connect their IP networks to the Internet do this in two steps:

  1. Source connectivity to the Internet from transit providers (ISPs).
  2. Purchase, operate, and maintain network function specific hardware appliances. Think hardware load balancers, firewalls, DDoS mitigation equipment, WAN optimization, and more.

Each of these boxes costs time and money to maintain, not to mention the skilled, expensive people required to properly run them. Each additional link in the chain makes a network harder to manage.

This all sounded familiar to us. We had an aha! moment: we had the same issues managing our datacenter networks that power all of our products, and we had spent significant time and effort building solutions to those problems. Now, nine years later, we had a robust set of tools we could turn into products for our own customers.

Magic Transit aims to bring the traditional datacenter hardware model into the cloud, packaging transit with all the network “hardware” you might need to keep your network fast, reliable, and secure. Once deployed, Magic Transit allows seamless provisioning of virtualized network functions, including routing, DDoS mitigation, firewalling, load balancing, and traffic acceleration services.

Magic Transit is your network’s on-ramp to the Internet

Magic Transit delivers its connectivity, security, and performance benefits by serving as the “front door” to your IP network. This means it accepts IP packets destined for your network, processes them, and then outputs them to your origin infrastructure.

Connecting to the Internet via Cloudflare offers numerous benefits. Starting with the most basic, Cloudflare is one of the most extensively connected networks on the Internet. We work with carriers, Internet exchanges, and peering partners around the world to ensure that a bit placed on our network will reach its destination quickly and reliably, no matter the destination.

An example deployment: Acme Corp

Let’s walk through how a customer might deploy Magic Transit. Customer Acme Corp. owns the IP prefix 203.0.113.0/24, which they use to address a rack of hardware they run in their own physical datacenter. Acme currently announces routes to the Internet from their customer-premise equipment (CPE, aka a router at the perimeter of their datacenter), telling the world 203.0.113.0/24 is reachable from their autonomous system number, AS64512. Acme has DDoS mitigation and firewall hardware appliances on-premise.

Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operate

Acme wants to connect to the Cloudflare Network to improve the security and performance of their own network. Specifically, they’ve been the target of distributed denial of service attacks, and want to sleep soundly at night without relying on on-premise hardware. This is where Cloudflare comes in.

Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operate

Deploying Magic Transit in front of their network is simple:

  1. Cloudflare uses Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to announce Acme’s 203.0.113.0/24 prefix from Cloudflare’s edge, with Acme’s permission.
  2. Cloudflare begins ingesting packets destined for the Acme IP prefix.
  3. Magic Transit applies DDoS mitigation and firewall rules to the network traffic. After it is ingested by the Cloudflare network, traffic that would benefit from HTTPS caching and WAF inspection can be “upgraded” to our Layer 7 HTTPS pipeline without incurring additional network hops.
  4. Acme would like Cloudflare to use Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) to tunnel traffic back from the Cloudflare Network back to Acme’s datacenter. GRE tunnels are initiated from anycast endpoints back to Acme’s premise. Through the magic of anycast, the tunnels are constantly and simultaneously connected to hundreds of network locations, ensuring the tunnels are highly available and resilient to network failures that would bring down traditionally formed GRE tunnels.
  5. Cloudflare egresses packets bound for Acme over these GRE tunnels.

Let’s dive deeper on how the DDoS mitigation included in Magic Transit works.

Magic Transit protects networks from DDoS attack

Customers deploying Cloudflare Magic Transit instantly get access to the same IP-layer DDoS protection system that has protected the Cloudflare Network for the past 9 years. This is the same mitigation system that stopped a 942Gbps attack dead in its tracks, in seconds. This is the same mitigation system that knew how to stop memcached amplification attacks days before a 1.3Tbps attack took down Github, which did not have Cloudflare watching its back. This is the same mitigation we trust every day to protect Cloudflare, and now it protects your network.

Cloudflare has historically protected Layer 7 HTTP and HTTPS applications from attacks at all layers of the OSI Layer model. The DDoS protection our customers have come to know and love relies on a blend of techniques, but can be broken into a few complementary defenses:

  1. Anycast and a network presence in 193 cities around the world allows our network to get close to users and attackers, allowing us to soak up traffic close to the source without introducing significant latency.
  2. 30+Tbps of network capacity allows us to soak up a lot of traffic close to the source. Cloudflare's network has more capacity to stop DDoS attacks than that of Akamai Prolexic, Imperva, Neustar, and Radware — combined.
  3. Our HTTPS reverse proxy absorbs L3 (IP layer) and L4 (TCP layer) attacks by terminating connections and re-establishing them to the origin. This stops most spurious packet transmissions from ever getting close to a customer origin server.
  4. Layer 7 mitigations and rate limiting stop floods at the HTTPS application layer.

Looking at the above description carefully, you might notice something: our reverse proxy servers protect our customers by terminating connections, but our network and servers still get slammed by the L3 and 4 attacks we stop on behalf of our customers. How do we protect our own infrastructure from these attacks?

Enter Gatebot!

Gatebot is a suite of software running on every one of our servers inside each of our datacenters in the 193 cities we operate, constantly analyzing and blocking attack traffic. Part of Gatebot’s beauty is its simple architecture; it sits silently, in wait, sampling packets as they pass from the network card into the kernel and onward into userspace. Gatebot does not have a learning or warm-up period. As soon as it detects an attack, it instructs the kernel of the machine it is running on to drop the packet, log its decision, and move on.

Historically, if you wanted to protect your network from a DDoS attack, you might have purchased a specialized piece of hardware to sit at the perimeter of your network. This hardware box (let’s call it “The DDoS Protection Box”) would have been fantastically expensive, pretty to look at (as pretty as a 2U hardware box could get), and required a ton of recurring effort and money to stay on its feet, keep its licence up to date, and keep its attack detection system accurate and trained.

For one thing, it would have to be carefully monitored to make sure it was stopping attacks but not stopping legitimate traffic. For another, if an attacker managed to generate enough traffic to saturate your datacenter’s transit links to the Internet, you were out of luck; no box sitting inside your datacenter can protect you from an attack generating enough traffic to congest the links running from the outside world to the datacenter itself.

Early on, Cloudflare considered buying The DDoS Protection Box(es) to protect our various network locations, but ruled them out quickly. Buying hardware would have incurred substantial cost and complexity. In addition, buying, racking, and managing specialized pieces of hardware makes a network hard to scale. There had to be a better way. We set out to solve this problem ourselves, starting from first principles and modern technology.

To make our modern approach to DDoS mitigation work, we had to invent a suite of tools and techniques to allow us to do ultra-high performance networking on a generic x86 server running Linux.

At the core of our network data plane is the eXpress Data Path (XDP) and the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF), a set of APIs that allow us to build ultra-high performance networking applications in the Linux kernel. My colleagues have written extensively about how we use XDP and eBPF to stop DDoS attacks:

At the end of the day, we ended up with a DDoS mitigation system that:

  • Is delivered by our entire network, spread across 193 cities around the world. To put this another way, our network doesn’t have the concept of “scrubbing centers” — every single one of our network locations is always mitigating attacks, all the time. This means faster attack mitigation and minimal latency impact for your users.
  • Has exceptionally fast times to mitigate, with most attacks mitigated in 10s or less.
  • Was built in-house, giving us deep visibility into its behavior and the ability to rapidly develop new mitigations as we see new attack types.
  • Is deployed as a service, and is horizontally scalable. Adding x86 hardware running our DDoS mitigation software stack to a datacenter (or adding another network location) instantly brings more DDoS mitigation capacity online.

Gatebot is designed to protect Cloudflare infrastructure from attack. And today, as part of Magic Transit, customers operating their own IP networks and infrastructure can rely on Gatebot to protect their own network.

Magic Transit puts your network hardware in the cloud

We’ve covered how Cloudflare Magic Transit connects your network to the Internet, and how it protects you from DDoS attack. If you were running your network the old-fashioned way, this is where you’d stop to buy firewall hardware, and maybe another box to do load balancing.

With Magic Transit, you don’t need those boxes. We have a long track record of delivering common network functions (firewalls, load balancers, etc.) as services. Up until this point, customers deploying our services have relied on DNS to bring traffic to our edge, after which our Layer 3 (IP), Layer 4 (TCP & UDP), and Layer 7 (HTTP, HTTPS, and DNS) stacks take over and deliver performance and security to our customers.

Magic Transit is designed to handle your entire network, but does not enforce a one-size-fits-all approach to what services get applied to which portion of your traffic. To revisit Acme, our example customer from above, they have brought 203.0.113.0/24 to the Cloudflare Network. This represents 256 IPv4 addresses, some of which (eg 203.0.113.8/30) might front load balancers and HTTP servers, others mail servers, and others still custom UDP-based applications.

Each of these sub-ranges may have different security and traffic management requirements. Magic Transit allows you to configure specific IP addresses with their own suite of services, or apply the same configuration to large portions (or all) of your block.

Taking the above example, Acme may wish that the 203.0.113.8/30 block containing HTTP services fronted by a traditional hardware load balancer instead deploy the Cloudflare Load Balancer, and also wants HTTP traffic analyzed with Cloudflare’s WAF and content cached by our CDN. With Magic Transit, deploying these network functions is straight-forward — a few clicks in our dashboard or API calls will have your traffic handled at a higher layer of network abstraction, with all the attendant goodies applying application level load balancing, firewall, and caching logic bring.

This is just one example of a deployment customers might pursue. We’ve worked with several who just want pure IP passthrough, with DDoS mitigation applied to specific IP addresses. Want that? We got you!

Magic Transit runs on the entire Cloudflare Global Network. Or, no more scrubs!

When you connect your network to Cloudflare Magic Transit, you get access to the entire Cloudflare network. This means all of our network locations become your network locations. Our network capacity becomes your network capacity, at your disposal to power your experiences, deliver your content, and mitigate attacks on your infrastructure.

How expansive is the Cloudflare Network? We’re in 193 cities worldwide, with more than 30Tbps of network capacity spread across them. Cloudflare operates within 100 milliseconds of 98% of the Internet-connected population in the developed world, and 93% of the Internet-connected population globally (for context, the blink of an eye is 300-400 milliseconds).

Magic Transit makes your network smarter, better, stronger, and cheaper to operateAreas of the globe within 100 milliseconds of a Cloudflare datacenter.

Just as we built our own products in house, we also built our network in house. Every product runs in every datacenter, meaning our entire network delivers all of our services. This might not have been the case if we had assembled our product portfolio piecemeal through acquisition, or not had completeness of vision when we set out to build our current suite of services.

The end result for customers of Magic Transit: a network presence around the globe as soon you come on board. Full access to a diverse set of services worldwide. All delivered with latency and performance in mind.

We'll be sharing a lot more technical detail on how we deliver Magic Transit in the coming weeks and months.

Magic Transit lowers total cost of ownership

Traditional network services don’t come cheap; they require high capital outlays up front, investment in staff to operate, and ongoing maintenance contracts to stay functional. Just as our product aims to be disruptive technically, we want to disrupt traditional network cost-structures as well.

Magic Transit is delivered and billed as a service. You pay for what you use, and can add services at any time. Your team will thank you for its ease of management; your management will thank you for its ease of accounting. That sounds pretty good to us!

Magic Transit is available today

We’ve worked hard over the past nine years to get our network, management tools, and network functions as a service into the state they’re in today. We’re excited to get the tools we use every day in customers’ hands.

So that brings us to naming. When we showed this to customers the most common word they used was ‘whoa.’ When we pressed what they meant by that they almost all said: ‘It’s so much better than any solution we’ve seen before. It’s, like, magic!’ So it seems only natural, if a bit cheesy, that we call this product what it is: Magic Transit.

We think this is all pretty magical, and think you will too. Contact our Enterprise Sales Team today.

Categories: Technology

Magic Transit: Network functions at Cloudflare scale

CloudFlare - Tue, 13/08/2019 - 14:00
 Network functions at Cloudflare scale

Today we announced Cloudflare Magic Transit, which makes Cloudflare’s network available to any IP traffic on the Internet. Up until now, Cloudflare has primarily operated proxy services: our servers terminate HTTP, TCP, and UDP sessions with Internet users and pass that data through new sessions they create with origin servers. With Magic Transit, we are now also operating at the IP layer: in addition to terminating sessions, our servers are applying a suite of network functions (DoS mitigation, firewalling, routing, and so on) on a packet-by-packet basis.

Over the past nine years, we’ve built a robust, scalable global network that currently spans 193 cities in over 90 countries and is ever growing. All Cloudflare customers benefit from this scale thanks to two important techniques. The first is anycast networking. Cloudflare was an early adopter of anycast, using this routing technique to distribute Internet traffic across our data centers. It means that any data center can handle any customer’s traffic, and we can spin up new data centers without needing to acquire and provision new IP addresses. The second technique is homogeneous server architecture. Every server in each of our edge data centers is capable of running every task. We build our servers on commodity hardware, making it easy to quickly increase our processing capacity by adding new servers to existing data centers. Having no specialty hardware to depend on has also led us to develop an expertise in pushing the limits of what’s possible in networking using modern Linux kernel techniques.

Magic Transit is built on the same network using the same techniques, meaning our customers can now run their network functions at Cloudflare scale. Our fast, secure, reliable global edge becomes our customers’ edge. To explore how this works, let’s follow the journey of a packet from a user on the Internet to a Magic Transit customer’s network.

Putting our DoS mitigation to work… for you!

In the announcement blog post we describe an example deployment for Acme Corp. Let’s continue with this example here. When Acme brings their IP prefix 203.0.113.0/24 to Cloudflare, we start announcing that prefix to our transit providers, peers, and to Internet exchanges in each of our data centers around the globe. Additionally, Acme stops announcing the prefix to their own ISPs. This means that any IP packet on the Internet with a destination address within Acme’s prefix is delivered to a nearby Cloudflare data center, not to Acme’s router.

Let’s say I want to access Acme’s FTP server on 203.0.113.100 from my computer in Cloudflare’s office in Champaign, IL. My computer generates a TCP SYN packet with destination address 203.0.113.100 and sends it out to the Internet. Thanks to anycast, that packet ends up at Cloudflare’s data center in Chicago, which is the closest data center (in terms of Internet routing distance) to Champaign. The packet arrives on the data center’s router, which uses ECMP (Equal Cost Multi-Path) routing to select which server should handle the packet and dispatches the packet to the selected server.

Once at the server, the packet flows through our XDP- and iptables-based DoS detection and mitigation functions. If this TCP SYN packet were determined to be part of an attack, it would be dropped and that would be the end of it. Fortunately for me, the packet is permitted to pass.

So far, this looks exactly like any other traffic on Cloudflare’s network. Because of our expertise in running a global anycast network we’re able to attract Magic Transit customer traffic to every data center and apply the same DoS mitigation solution that has been protecting Cloudflare for years. Our DoS solution has handled some of the largest attacks ever recorded, including a 942Gbps SYN flood in 2018. Below is a screenshot of a recent SYN flood of 300M packets per second. Our architecture lets us scale to stop the largest attacks.

 Network functions at Cloudflare scaleNetwork namespaces for isolation and control

The above looked identical to how all other Cloudflare traffic is processed, but this is where the similarities end. For our other services, the TCP SYN packet would now be dispatched to a local proxy process (e.g. our nginx-based HTTP/S stack). For Magic Transit, we instead want to dynamically provision and apply customer-defined network functions like firewalls and routing. We needed a way to quickly spin up and configure these network functions while also providing inter-network isolation. For that, we turned to network namespaces.

Namespaces are a collection of Linux kernel features for creating lightweight virtual instances of system resources that can be shared among a group of processes. Namespaces are a fundamental building block for containerization in Linux. Notably, Docker is built on Linux namespaces. A network namespace is an isolated instance of the Linux network stack, including its own network interfaces (with their own eBPF hooks), routing tables, netfilter configuration,, and so on. Network namespaces give us a low-cost mechanism to rapidly apply customer-defined network configurations in isolation, all with built-in Linux kernel features so there’s no performance hit from userspace packet forwarding or proxying.

When a new customer starts using Magic Transit, we create a brand new network namespace for that customer on every server across our edge network (did I mention that every server can run every task?). We built a daemon that runs on our servers and is responsible for managing these network namespaces and their configurations. This daemon is constantly reading configuration updates from Quicksilver, our globally distributed key-value store, and applying customer-defined configurations for firewalls, routing, etc, inside the customer’s namespace. For example, if Acme wants to provision a firewall rule to allow FTP traffic (TCP ports 20 and 21) to 203.0.113.100, that configuration is propagated globally through Quicksilver and the Magic Transit daemon applies the firewall rule by adding an nftables rule to the Acme customer namespace:

# Apply nftables rule inside Acme’s namespace $ sudo ip netns exec acme_namespace nft add rule inet filter prerouting ip daddr 203.0.113.100 tcp dport 20-21 accept

Getting the customer’s traffic to their network namespace requires a little routing configuration in the default network namespace. When a network namespace is created, a pair of virtual ethernet (veth) interfaces is also created: one in the default namespace and one in the newly created namespace. This interface pair creates a “virtual wire” for delivering network traffic into and out of the new network namespace. In the default network namespace, we maintain a routing table that forwards Magic Transit customer IP prefixes to the veths corresponding to those customers’ namespaces. We use iptables to mark the packets that are destined for Magic Transit customer prefixes, and we have a routing rule that specifies that these specially marked packets should use the Magic Transit routing table.

(Why go to the trouble of marking packets in iptables and maintaining a separate routing table? Isolation. By keeping Magic Transit routing configurations separate we reduce the risk of accidentally modifying the default routing table in a way that affects how non-Magic Transit traffic flows through our edge.)

 Network functions at Cloudflare scale


Network namespaces provide a lightweight environment where a Magic Transit customer can run and manage network functions in isolation, letting us put full control in the customer’s hands.

GRE + anycast = magic

After passing through the edge network functions, the TCP SYN packet is finally ready to be delivered back to the customer’s network infrastructure. Because Acme Corp. does not have a network footprint in a colocation facility with Cloudflare, we need to deliver their network traffic over the public Internet.

This poses a problem. The destination address of the TCP SYN packet is 203.0.113.100, but the only network announcing the IP prefix 203.0.113.0/24 on the Internet is Cloudflare. This means that we can’t simply forward this packet out to the Internet—it will boomerang right back to us! In order to deliver this packet to Acme we need to use a technique called tunneling.

Tunneling is a method of carrying traffic from one network over another network. In our case, it involves encapsulating Acme’s IP packets inside of IP packets that can be delivered to Acme’s router over the Internet. There are a number of common tunneling protocols, but Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) is often used for its simplicity and widespread vendor support.

GRE tunnel endpoints are configured both on Cloudflare’s servers (inside of Acme’s network namespace) and on Acme’s router. Cloudflare servers then encapsulate IP packets destined for 203.0.113.0/24 inside of IP packets destined for a publicly-routable IP address for Acme’s router, which decapsulates the packets and emits them into Acme’s internal network.

 Network functions at Cloudflare scale

Now, I’ve omitted an important detail in the diagram above: the IP address of Cloudflare’s side of the GRE tunnel. Configuring a GRE tunnel requires specifying an IP address for each side, and the outer IP header for packets sent over the tunnel must use these specific addresses. But Cloudflare has thousands of servers, each of which may need to deliver packets to the customer through a tunnel. So how many Cloudflare IP addresses (and GRE tunnels) does the customer need to talk to? The answer: just one, thanks to the magic of anycast.

Cloudflare uses anycast IP addresses for our GRE tunnel endpoints, meaning that any server in any data center is capable of encapsulating and decapsulating packets for the same GRE tunnel. How is this possible? Isn’t a tunnel a point-to-point link? The GRE protocol itself is stateless—each packet is processed independently and without requiring any negotiation or coordination between tunnel endpoints. While the tunnel is technically bound to an IP address it need not be bound to a specific device. Any device that can strip off the outer headers and then route the inner packet can handle any GRE packet sent over the tunnel. Actually, in the context of anycast the term “tunnel” is misleading since it implies a link between two fixed points. With Cloudflare’s Anycast GRE, a single “tunnel” gives you a conduit to every server in every data center on Cloudflare’s global edge.

 Network functions at Cloudflare scale

One very powerful consequence of Anycast GRE is that it eliminates single points of failure. Traditionally, GRE-over-Internet can be problematic because an Internet outage between the two GRE endpoints fully breaks the “tunnel”. This means reliable data delivery requires going through the headache of setting up and maintaining redundant GRE tunnels terminating at different physical sites and rerouting traffic when one of the tunnels breaks. But because Cloudflare is encapsulating and delivering customer traffic from every server in every data center, there is no single “tunnel” to break. This means Magic Transit customers can enjoy the redundancy and reliability of terminating tunnels at multiple physical sites while only setting up and maintaining a single GRE endpoint, making their jobs simpler.

Our scale is now your scale

Magic Transit is a powerful new way to deploy network functions at scale. We’re not just giving you a virtual instance, we’re giving you a global virtual edge. Magic Transit takes the hardware appliances you would typically rack in your on-prem network and distributes them across every server in every data center in Cloudflare’s network. This gives you access to our global anycast network, our fleet of servers capable of running your tasks, and our engineering expertise building fast, reliable, secure networks. Our scale is now your scale.

Categories: Technology

PHP Conference Brasil 2019

PHP - Mon, 12/08/2019 - 09:21
Categories: Technology

The Serverlist: Building out the SHAMstack

CloudFlare - Fri, 09/08/2019 - 17:01
 Building out the SHAMstack

Check out our seventh edition of The Serverlist below. Get the latest scoop on the serverless space, get your hands dirty with new developer tutorials, engage in conversations with other serverless developers, and find upcoming meetups and conferences to attend.

Sign up below to have The Serverlist sent directly to your mailbox.

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Categories: Technology

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

CloudFlare - Thu, 08/08/2019 - 23:00
Introducing Certificate Transparency MonitoringIntroducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

Today we’re launching Certificate Transparency Monitoring (my summer project as an intern!) to help customers spot malicious certificates. If you opt into CT Monitoring, we’ll send you an email whenever a certificate is issued for one of your domains. We crawl all public logs to find these certificates quickly. CT Monitoring is available now in public beta and can be enabled in the Crypto Tab of the Cloudflare dashboard.

Background

Most web browsers include a lock icon in the address bar. This icon is actually a button — if you’re a security advocate or a compulsive clicker (I’m both), you’ve probably clicked it before! Here’s what happens when you do just that in Google Chrome:

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

This seems like good news. The Cloudflare blog has presented a valid certificate, your data is private, and everything is secure. But what does this actually mean?

Certificates

Your browser is performing some behind-the-scenes work to keep you safe. When you request a website (say, cloudflare.com), the website should present a certificate that proves its identity. This certificate is like a stamp of approval: it says that your connection is secure. In other words, the certificate proves that content was not intercepted or modified while in transit to you. An altered Cloudflare site would be problematic, especially if it looked like the actual Cloudflare site. Certificates protect us by including information about websites and their owners.

We pass around these certificates because the honor system doesn’t work on the Internet. If you want a certificate for your own website, just request one from a Certificate Authority (CA), or sign up for Cloudflare and we’ll do it for you! CAs issue certificates just as real-life notaries stamp legal documents. They confirm your identity, look over some data, and use their special status to grant you a digital certificate. Popular CAs include DigiCert, Let’s Encrypt, and Sectigo. This system has served us well because it has kept imposters in check, but also promoted trust between domain owners and their visitors.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

Unfortunately, nothing is perfect.

It turns out that CAs make mistakes. In rare cases, they become reckless. When this happens, illegitimate certificates are issued (even though they appear to be authentic). If a CA accidentally issues a certificate for your website, but you did not request the certificate, you have a problem. Whoever received the certificate might be able to:

  1. Steal login credentials from your visitors.
  2. Interrupt your usual services by serving different content.

These attacks do happen, so there’s good reason to care about certificates. More often, domain owners lose track of their certificates and panic when they discover unexpected certificates. We need a way to prevent these situations from ruining the entire system.

Certificate Transparency

Ah, Certificate Transparency (CT). CT solves the problem I just described by making all certificates public and easy to audit. When CAs issue certificates, they must submit certificates to at least two “public logs.” This means that collectively, the logs carry important data about all trusted certificates on the Internet. Several companies offer CT logs — Google has launched a few of its own. We announced Cloudflare's Nimbus log last year.

Logs are really, really big, and often hold hundreds of millions of certificate records.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

The log infrastructure helps browsers validate websites’ identities. When you request cloudflare.com in Safari or Google Chrome, the browser will actually require Cloudflare’s certificate to be registered in a CT log. If the certificate isn’t found in a log, you won’t see the lock icon next to the address bar. Instead, the browser will tell you that the website you’re trying to access is not secure. Are you going to visit a website marked “NOT SECURE”? Probably not.

There are systems that audit CT logs and report illegitimate certificates. Therefore, if your browser finds a valid certificate that is also trusted in a log, everything is secure.

What We're Announcing Today

Cloudflare has been an industry leader in CT. In addition to Nimbus, we launched a CT dashboard called Merkle Town and explained how we made it. Today, we’re releasing a public beta of Certificate Transparency Monitoring.

If you opt into CT Monitoring, we’ll send you an email whenever a certificate is issued for one of your domains. When you get an alert, don’t panic; we err on the side of caution by sending alerts whenever a possible domain match is found. Sometimes you may notice a suspicious certificate. Maybe you won’t recognize the issuer, or the subdomain is not one you offer (e.g. slowinternet.cloudflare.com). Alerts are sent quickly so you can contact a CA if something seems wrong.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

This raises the question: if services already audit public logs, why are alerts necessary? Shouldn’t errors be found automatically? Well no, because auditing is not exhaustive. The best person to audit your certificates is you. You know your website. You know your personal information. Cloudflare will put relevant certificates right in front of you.

You can enable CT Monitoring on the Cloudflare dashboard. Just head over to the Crypto Tab and find the “Certificate Transparency Monitoring” card. You can always turn the feature off if you’re too popular in the CT world.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

If you’re on a Business or Enterprise plan, you can tell us who to notify. Instead of emailing the zone owner (which we do for Free and Pro customers), we accept up to 10 email addresses as alert recipients. We do this to avoid overwhelming large teams. These emails do not have to be tied to a Cloudflare account and can be manually added or removed at any time.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

How This Actually Works

Our Cryptography and SSL teams worked hard to make this happen; they built on the work of some clever tools mentioned earlier:

  • Merkle Town is a hub for CT data. We process all trusted certificates and present relevant statistics on our website. This means that every certificate issued on the Internet passes through Cloudflare, and all the data is public (so no privacy concerns here).
  • Cloudflare Nimbus is our very own CT log. It contains more than 400 million certificates.

Introducing Certificate Transparency MonitoringNote: Cloudflare, Google, and DigiCert are not the only CT log providers.

So here’s the process... At some point in time, you (or an impostor) request a certificate for your website. A Certificate Authority approves the request and issues the certificate. Within 24 hours, the CA sends this certificate to a set of CT logs. This is where we come in: Cloudflare uses an internal process known as “The Crawler” to look through millions of certificate records. Merkle Town dispatches The Crawler to monitor CT logs and check for new certificates. When The Crawler finds a new certificate, it pulls the entire certificate through Merkle Town.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

When we process the certificate in Merkle Town, we also check it against a list of monitored domains. If you have CT Monitoring enabled, we’ll send you an alert immediately. This is only possible because of Merkle Town’s existing infrastructure. Also, The Crawler is ridiculously fast.

Introducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

I Got a Certificate Alert. What Now?

Good question. Most of the time, certificate alerts are routine. Certificates expire and renew on a regular basis, so it’s totally normal to get these emails. If everything looks correct (the issuer, your domain name, etc.), go ahead and toss that email in the trash.

In rare cases, you might get an email that looks suspicious. We provide a detailed support article that will help. The basic protocol is this:

  1. Contact the CA (listed as “Issuer” in the email).
  2. Explain why you think the certificate is suspicious.
  3. The CA should revoke the certificate (if it really is malicious).

We also have a friendly support team that can be reached here. While Cloudflare is not at CA and cannot revoke certificates, our support team knows quite a bit about certificate management and is ready to help.

The FutureIntroducing Certificate Transparency Monitoring

Certificate Transparency has started making regular appearances on the Cloudflare blog. Why? It’s required by Chrome and Safari, which dominate the browser market and set precedents for Internet security. But more importantly, CT can help us spot malicious certificates before they are used in attacks. This is why we will continue to refine and improve our certificate detection methods.

What are you waiting for? Go enable Certificate Transparency Monitoring!

Categories: Technology

PHP Conference Japan 2019 CFP Started

PHP - Thu, 08/08/2019 - 12:33
Categories: Technology

PHP Conference Japan 2019

PHP - Thu, 08/08/2019 - 11:29
Categories: Technology

PHP 7.4.0beta2 released!

PHP - Thu, 08/08/2019 - 09:15
Categories: Technology

Bringing Federated Search to the State of Georgia

Drupal - Tue, 06/08/2019 - 00:10
Digital Services Georgia websiteCompleted Drupal site or project URL: https://georgia.gov/

The State of Georgia’s Digital Services team (DSGa) supports a network of over 100 websites running on Drupal. Originally built in Drupal 7, DSGa began transitioning to a new Drupal 8 platform in 2019. Until this transition is completed, DSGa is responsible for supporting both Drupal 7 and Drupal 8 sites.

Sites in the network need the capacity to search content from both their own site and other sites, regardless of the version of Drupal being used. While both platforms are hosted on Acquia and use Acquia Search, their Drupal 7 search solution could not incorporate content from the new Drupal 8 sites. This left the DSGa team in an awkward position: either lose functionality while they waited for sites to transition to Drupal 8 or delay the launch of the new platform until all sites were ready.

Fortunately, there was another option. Using the open source Federated Search solution, Palantir collaborated with the DSGa and their development partners to re-launch network-wide search with added functionality in both Drupal 8 and Drupal 7 without any service interruption for site visitors.

Categories: Technology

Terminating Service for 8Chan

CloudFlare - Mon, 05/08/2019 - 02:44

The mass shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio are horrific tragedies. In the case of the El Paso shooting, the suspected terrorist gunman appears to have been inspired by the forum website known as 8chan. Based on evidence we've seen, it appears that he posted a screed to the site immediately before beginning his terrifying attack on the El Paso Walmart killing 20 people.

Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. Nearly the same thing happened on 8chan before the terror attack in Christchurch, New Zealand. The El Paso shooter specifically referenced the Christchurch incident and appears to have been inspired by the largely unmoderated discussions on 8chan which glorified the previous massacre. In a separate tragedy, the suspected killer in the Poway, California synagogue shooting also posted a hate-filled “open letter” on 8chan. 8chan has repeatedly proven itself to be a cesspool of hate.

8chan is among the more than 19 million Internet properties that use Cloudflare's service. We just sent notice that we are terminating 8chan as a customer effective at midnight tonight Pacific Time. The rationale is simple: they have proven themselves to be lawless and that lawlessness has caused multiple tragic deaths. Even if 8chan may not have violated the letter of the law in refusing to moderate their hate-filled community, they have created an environment that revels in violating its spirit.

We do not take this decision lightly. Cloudflare is a network provider. In pursuit of our goal of helping build a better internet, we’ve considered it important to provide our security services broadly to make sure as many users as possible are secure, and thereby making cyberattacks less attractive — regardless of the content of those websites.  Many of our customers run platforms of their own on top of our network. If our policies are more conservative than theirs it effectively undercuts their ability to run their services and set their own policies. We reluctantly tolerate content that we find reprehensible, but we draw the line at platforms that have demonstrated they directly inspire tragic events and are lawless by design. 8chan has crossed that line. It will therefore no longer be allowed to use our services.

What Will Happen Next

Unfortunately, we have seen this situation before and so we have a good sense of what will play out. Almost exactly two years ago we made the determination to kick another disgusting site off Cloudflare's network: the Daily Stormer. That caused a brief interruption in the site's operations but they quickly came back online using a Cloudflare competitor. That competitor at the time promoted as a feature the fact that they didn't respond to legal process. Today, the Daily Stormer is still available and still disgusting. They have bragged that they have more readers than ever. They are no longer Cloudflare's problem, but they remain the Internet's problem.

I have little doubt we'll see the same happen with 8chan. While removing 8chan from our network takes heat off of us, it does nothing to address why hateful sites fester online. It does nothing to address why mass shootings occur. It does nothing to address why portions of the population feel so disenchanted they turn to hate. In taking this action we've solved our own problem, but we haven't solved the Internet's.

In the two years since the Daily Stormer what we have done to try and solve the Internet’s deeper problem is engage with law enforcement and civil society organizations to try and find solutions. Among other things, that resulted in us cooperating around monitoring potential hate sites on our network and notifying law enforcement when there was content that contained an indication of potential violence. We will continue to work within the legal process to share information when we can to hopefully prevent horrific acts of violence. We believe this is our responsibility and, given Cloudflare's scale and reach, we are hopeful we will continue to make progress toward solving the deeper problem.

Rule of Law

We continue to feel incredibly uncomfortable about playing the role of content arbiter and do not plan to exercise it often. Some have wrongly speculated this is due to some conception of the United States' First Amendment. That is incorrect. First, we are a private company and not bound by the First Amendment. Second, the vast majority of our customers, and more than 50% of our revenue, comes from outside the United States where the First Amendment and similarly libertarian freedom of speech protections do not apply. The only relevance of the First Amendment in this case and others is that it allows us to choose who we do and do not do business with; it does not obligate us to do business with everyone.

Instead our concern has centered around another much more universal idea: the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law requires policies be transparent and consistent. While it has been articulated as a framework for how governments ensure their legitimacy, we have used it as a touchstone when we think about our own policies.

We have been successful because we have a very effective technological solution that provides security, performance, and reliability in an affordable and easy-to-use way. As a result of that, a huge portion of the Internet now sits behind our network. 10% of the top million, 17% of the top 100,000, and 19% of the top 10,000 Internet properties use us today. 10% of the Fortune 1,000 are paying Cloudflare customers.

Cloudflare is not a government. While we've been successful as a company, that does not give us the political legitimacy to make determinations on what content is good and bad. Nor should it. Questions around content are real societal issues that need politically legitimate solutions. We will continue to engage with lawmakers around the world as they set the boundaries of what is acceptable in their countries through due process of law. And we will comply with those boundaries when and where they are set.

Europe, for example, has taken a lead in this area. As we've seen governments there attempt to address hate and terror content online, there is recognition that different obligations should be placed on companies that organize and promote content — like Facebook and YouTube — rather than those that are mere conduits for that content. Conduits, like Cloudflare, are not visible to users and therefore cannot be transparent and consistent about their policies.

The unresolved question is how should the law deal with platforms that ignore or actively thwart the Rule of Law? That's closer to the situation we have seen with the Daily Stormer and 8chan. They are lawless platforms. In cases like these, where platforms have been designed to be lawless and unmoderated, and where the platforms have demonstrated their ability to cause real harm, the law may need additional remedies. We and other technology companies need to work with policy makers in order to help them understand the problem and define these remedies. And, in some cases, it may mean moving enforcement mechanisms further down the technical stack.

Our Obligation

Cloudflare's mission is to help build a better Internet. At some level firing 8chan as a customer is easy. They are uniquely lawless and that lawlessness has contributed to multiple horrific tragedies. Enough is enough.

What's hard is defining the policy that we can enforce transparently and consistently going forward. We, and other technology companies like us that enable the great parts of the Internet, have an obligation to help propose solutions to deal with the parts we're not proud of. That's our obligation and we're committed to it.

Unfortunately the action we take today won’t fix hate online. It will almost certainly not even remove 8chan from the Internet. But it is the right thing to do. Hate online is a real issue. Here are some organizations that have active work to help address it:

Our whole Cloudflare team’s thoughts are with the families grieving in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio this evening.

Categories: Technology

PHP 7.1.31 Released

PHP - Thu, 01/08/2019 - 20:19
Categories: Technology

PHP 7.2.21 Released

PHP - Thu, 01/08/2019 - 09:43
Categories: Technology

PHP 7.3.8 Release Announcement

PHP - Thu, 01/08/2019 - 09:19
Categories: Technology

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